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AIDING THE TRANSFORMATION OF
ECONOMIES: IS THE FUND'S
CONDITIONALITY APPROPRIATE TO
THE TASK?*
CYNTHIA C. LICHTENSTEIN**
In this Essay, Professor Lichtenstein suggests that the Group ofSeven's decision
to use the International Monetary Fund to channel economic assistance to Russia
was a mistake. Professor Lichtenstein examines the International Monetary
Fund's charter, history, and institutional culture. She concludes that it is not a
suitable vehicle for funneling the Group of Seven's promised aid to Russia.
N July 1993, the seven leading industrialized countries that meet to-
gether as the Group of Seven' (the "G-7"), delighted with the end of
the Cold War and with the prospect that President Boris Yeltsin of Rus-
sia, under the policies to be imposed by his chief economist and Deputy
Prime Minister Yegor T. Gaidar, would move full speed ahead to trans-
form Russia into a democratic nation with a privatized economy, pledged
$28.4 billion in grants and loans to Russia to aid its transformation to a
democratic market economy.2 Unfortunately for Russia, the G-7 has no
legal structure. The G-7 is just that-seven nations that meet together as
its members see the need; its only public announcements are diplomatic
communiques. Not only is the G-7 not an intergovernmental organiza-
tion, it has not established its own financing agency or development bank
to channel funds "pledged" to recipients. The G-7's lack of structure
contrasts with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(the "EBRD"), the creation of which was the result of a decision in 1990
by a group of Western industrialized nations to channel aid to Eastern
European countries to help their transition from centralized economies
to private market economies. The EBRD was founded with a charter
and specific instructions on how to proceed-and on what conditions-
to disburse the funds contributed to the new development bank by the
founding nations.3 The process of negotiating the terms of the EBRD's
charter, in the form of a treaty, forced its founding nations to conceptual-
ize what the ERBD was to achieve.4
In July 1993, however, the urgency of the Russian economic situation,
* Address given by Professor Cynthia C. Lichtenstein on March 31, 1994 as part of
the Fordhan University School of Law Graduate Colloquium 1993-1994.
** Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; Special Consultant, Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, New York.
1. The G-7 consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Japan, Canada and Italy.
2. See John-Thor Dahlburg, G-7 Gives Yeltsin More and Less Than He Wanted:
Diplomacy, L.A. Times, July 10, 1993, at 7.
3. See Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction & Develop-
ment, May 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1077 (1990).
4. For a brief discussion of the EBRD's founding, see Present at the Creation: A
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to say nothing of the speedy action desired by Russian reformers, seemed
to preclude the creation of a separate institution to channel the G-7's
promised $28.4 billion. What to do? The members of the G-7 simply
could have let their individual bilateral aid agencies disburse the prom-
ised amounts according to each country's own procedures. However, in
the case of the United States' contribution, to leave the fate of Russian
economic and democratic transformation to the Agency for International
Development (the "AID") with all the strings on aid disbursement that
Congress has written into AID's appropriation acts would achieve noth-
ing. Presumably the other members of the G-7 had similar structural
difficulties in granting this quantity of bilateral aid to Russia.5 Thus, the
G-7 decided to use an already existing international organization, the
International Monetary Fund (the "IMF" or the "Fund"), to do the "ad-
ministrative work" of disbursing the aid.
Why not? Although the Fund's founders in 1945 originally would not
have conceived of the Fund as a fairy godmother waving the magic wand
of grants and loans to change the Russian pumpkin into a Russian coach,
in recent years the Fund has begun to provide a type of lending, with the
rather extraordinary name of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facil-
ity (the "ESAF"), that seems extremely far from the founders' concep-
tion of the Fund. Moreover, in April 1993, the Fund created a
temporary facility,6 the Systemic Transformation Facility (the "STF"),
specifically for the purpose of lending to Russia "and the other states of
the former Soviet Union as well as other economies in transition."7
This Essay, however, suggests that the G-7's decision to use the Fund
for its foreign policy goal of support for Russia's hoped-for democratic
transformation was a mistake. My thesis of mistake is not based on any
economic theory of how to do transformation financing, but rather on
the idea that international economic institutions, like all institutions, are
products of their own history and that the Fund's culture, developed
over the fifty years of its history, does not make it a suitable vehicle for
funneling the G-7's $28.4 billion in aid to Russia. The choice of the
Fund to disburse the promised money would seem, as of this date,8 to be
New Development Bank for Europe in the Age of Environmental Awareness, 84 Am. Soc'y
Int'l Law, 77-95 (1990).
5. See Jeffrey Sachs, The Reformers' Tragedy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1994, at 17
("The U.S. and its allies had turned over the task of bailing out Russia to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank, principally because these institutions could
make loans that did not require Congressional or parliamentary authorization.")
6. This term is Fund jargon for the specialized forms of lending that the Fund has
created in recent years.
7. Special Facilities: Financing Helps Members Adjust to Special Balance of Pay-
ments Problems, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Survey Supplement, Oct. 1993, at
18, 20.
8. This Essay originally was prepared before the Fund's announcement on March 22
that it had agreed to provide Russia with $1.5 billion in aid in exchange for a promise of
new taxes and strict curbs on government spending. See Michael Specter, Russia
Promises Budget Curbs to Win Loan of $1.5 Billion, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1994, at Al.
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most problematic for both the G-7 and Russia itself. Indeed, the choice
has led to the unedifying spectacle of Professor Jeffrey Sachs, Professor
of International Trade at Harvard University and former economic advi-
sor to President Boris Yeltsin, blaming the Fund for the resurgence of
the "Communist Old Guard" in Russia.9 It also has led to the equally
unedifying spectacle of Michel Camdessus, the head of the Fund, pub-
licly proclaiming that the Fund has been made "a scapegoat" by the Rus-
sians, Western governments, and various experts for Russia's own
faltering economic reform effort. 10 Mr. Camdessus also added, some-
what plaintively, that according to its by-laws "the I.M.F. can only ex-
tend financing conditional on appropriate economic policies."I"
Mr. Camdessus was right. The legal structure and, indeed, the institu-
tional culture of the Fund has engraved into stone that "thou shall not
lend except upon conditions." Yet the only conditions that the Fund
seems capable of asking for are exactly the ones that Professor Sachs
deemed inappropriate to Russian needs.' 2 This is not to say the Fund is
at fault. It is only to say that the G-7 has asked the Fund to perform
services that are beyond its institutional capacities and the authoritative
interpretation of its charter. Further, this Essay suggests that the merg-
ing the World Bank and the Fund will not trump the problems associ-
ated with using the IMF to channel Western aid to sustain Russia in its
transformation.' 3 Finally, this Essay concludes that, in making eco-
nomic foreign policy, nations must consider the institutional frameworks
involved in the implementation of that policy. Elementary international
organization theory posits that appropriate vessels for cooperation in eco-
nomic assistance are necessary to achieve the policy goals.'"
Although Russia has squeezed out more of the promised aid from the Fund, just as the
Fund has squeezed out of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin the promise of expendi-
ture curbs, this does not change the analysis that the Fund process is not appropriate to
the G-7's foreign policy goal.
9. See Sachs, supra note 5.
10. Thomas L. Friedman, IMF Head Defends Russia Loan Policy Against Criticism,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1994, at Al.
11. Id Mr. Camdessus also noted that the Russians often did not provide the "basic
data which were needed to discuss seriously [the terms of the extension of credit]." Id.
12. See Sachs, supra note 5 ("The I.M.F.'s relentless advice was to cut the deficit, not
to find acceptable and noninflationary ways to finance part of it.").
13. For a discussion of this idea, see Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) with the World Bank?, 62 Fordham L. Rev. - (1994).
14. Interestingly, this same debate has taken place over the years in the institutional
structure that has been created by the former European Community (now the Union) to
aid the integration of less economically developed regions or members into the Commu-
nity. See Proceedings of the Second Joint Conference of the Amer. Soc'y of Int'l Law
and Nederlandse Vereniging Voor Internationaal Recht on Contemporary International
Law Issues, Regional Development Assistance to Reduce Disparities Among Member
Countries: Does EC Experience Point the Way for NAFTA? 209 (1993) (remarks of Joa-
chim Miiller-Borle). The Community started with a rather traditional development
bank, the European Investment Bank, which provides project lending to less developed
regions of the Community after assessing the proposals for each particular project and
the extent to which the particular project will aid growth. Conversely, the structural
1994] 1945
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A review of the IMF's legal structure will illustrate my thesis. The
Fund was created in 1945 by an international treaty signed by most of
the nations 5 that in 1945 also created the United Nations.1 6 In creating
the Fund, its founders stated in the Introductory Article to the Articles
of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (the "Fund Agree-
ment") that: "The International Monetary Fund is established and shall
operate in accordance with the following provisions: ... " " When the
parties to the Fund Agreement amended the Articles of Agreement in
1968, they changed the Introductory Article to read: "The International
Monetary Fund is established and shall operate in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement as originally adopted and subsequently
amended ... ."I' As amended in 1978 and unchanged to date, Article I
of the Fund Agreement states the Fund's "Purposes."' 19 It is not possible
to read this statement of purposes and to determine where, in the text,
bilateral or coordinated foreign assistance for economic transformation
channelled through the Fund would come. There is no specific mention
in the "Purposes" of the use of the Fund as a channel for aid and, as far
as granting financial assistance to its members, the closest the Fund
Agreement comes to recognizing such a purpose reads: "To give confi-
dence to members by making the general resources of the Fund tempo-
rarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments
without resorting to measures destructive of national or international
prosperity."2 ° These "general resources" of the Fund are the pool of
currencies contributed to the Fund by its members.
Note the reference to making the general resources of the Fund "tem-
porarily available." This phrase would seem to imply that, before mak-
ing its resources available-to aid members to deal with maladjustments
in their balances of payments-the Fund should inquire about whether
the member's need is going to be "temporary" or, in fact, if the member
funds established after 1975 by the Community and the new Cohesion Fund, which has
been established to aid the economically less able members of the Union to achieve the
economic criteria necessary under the Maastricht Treaty for admission into the European
Monetary Union, makes grants to particular programs when member state budgets can-
not cover on their own the particular objective of the particular program-a form of
compensatory finance. See id. This latter conception of aid to integration resembles Pro-
fessor Sachs' proposed medicine for the transformation of Russia-"international grants
and loans ... to help the Government pay its bills." Sachs, supra note 5.
15. Although represented at the Bretton Woods Conference, the Soviet Union did not
become a member of the Fund. See Andreas Lowenfeld, The International Monetary
System 17 nn. 1 & k (2d ed. 1984).
16. See id. at 17.
17. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, Intro-
ductory art., 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
18. Amendment of Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, May
31, 1968, Introductory art., 20 U.S.T. 2775.
19. See Second Amendment of Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, April 30, 1976, art. I, 29 U.S.T. 2203.
20. See id.
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drawing on the Fund's resources could not be expected to repay the
drawing, as borrowing from the Fund is called, for a period longer than
any reasonable interpretation of "temporary." The history of the Bret-
ton Woods Conference, at which the Fund Agreement and the World
Bank charter were drafted, indicates that Great Britain, led by Lord
John Maynard Keynes, and the United States, led by Harry Dexter
White, had quite different ideas about whether the Fund's members
"would be entitled to draw at will on the pools of currencies in the
Fund."21 In extending its resources, the United States took the position
that the Fund should have discretion in permitting drawings "if the
Fund's resources were to be conserved for the purposes for which the
Fund was established and if the Fund were to be influential in promoting
what it considered to be appropriate financial policies."I
The United States, in short, was insisting on what has come to be
called "conditionality," and it got it. One of the first steps taken by the
Executive Directors of the Fund was to promulgate in 1946 a decision on
the purposes for which Fund drawings could be used. 23 This decision
again used the words "temporary assistance" and suggests that requests
for drawings are subject to scrutiny by the Fund.24 Shortly afterwards in
1948, the controversy was renewed. At a time when the United States
was starting the Marshall Plan, it became worried that "allowing auto-
matic drawing rights would exhaust the Funds resources without reason-
able hope for early repayment."2 This time the Executive Directors
issued a decision that, as Professor Lowenfeld points out, "asserts the
right of the Fund to reject an application for a drawing or to accept it
subject to conditions. The Decision thus constituted a thorough-going
adoption of the United States view that drawing rights were to be
conditional." 26
That was in 1948, and the Fund has not deviated from the concept of
conditionality since. The Fund is an exemplar of the theory of familial
relations called "tough love." The Fund will promise the availability of
funds, but the applicant country must demonstrate that it will embark on
policies that, in the Fund's view, will enable the applicant country to
repay the borrowing as soon as possible. Moreover, the Fund has sought
to enforce an applicant's adherence to the agreed-upon economic policies
by dribbling out its loans. A country initially gets to take only part of its
21. Lowenfeld, supra, note 15, at 28.
22. Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective 113 (3d
ed. 1980).
23. Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 28 (quoting Executive Directors' decision) ("The
Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund interpret the Articles of Agree-
ment to mean that authority to use the resources of the Fund is limited to use in accord-
ance with its purposes to give temporary assistance in financing balance of payments
deficits on current account for monetary stabilization operations.").
24. See id
25. Id at 29.
26. Id
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standby, as Fund lines of credit are called. If the applicant country ad-
heres to the agreed-upon macroeconomic policies, then it gets to take out
more. The Fund is so conditioned to set conditions that it is no longer
capable of imagining making a transfer of funds that, say, simply makes
up a budget deficit while the country drawing upon the Fund's resources
decides itself upon the economic policies that might best aid it in its par-
ticular circumstances to grow, to transform, to achieve whatever are the
goals of the lending.27
But to return to our starting point, the Fund's purposes are set out in
the Fund Agreement. The use of the Fund's resources, however condi-
tioned, were to help members with temporary shortfalls in their balance
of payments. If growth is the goal of the aid, was not the World Bank
established at Bretton Woods to aid developing countries to grow? How
did the Fund get into the "growth" business? This, too, is a matter of
history,28 but that history illuminates the seemingly inseparable connec-
tion between multilateral lending through the Fund and conditionality.
For a period of time in the 1970s, a number of countries sought to
evade the dilemma of Fund conditionality by persuading Western banks
to recycle petroleum dollars into sovereign dollar lending. As private
creditors, banks disbursed loans, but had no enforcement mechanisms for
ensuring wise use of the proceeds. As numerous works point out, the
debt crisis of the late 1970s and the 1980s resulted from the inability of
indebted countries to pay either the interest or principal on these pri-
vately extended sovereign loans from private banks and the consequent
threat to the solvency of those banks themselves. As the debt crisis deep-
ened, the bankers themselves realized that they had been caught in a
trap: without a Fund program to which the indebted country was re-
quired to adhere, the banks had no power to force a borrowing country
to pay, and the private banks' only remedy was to cease lending and to
call the loans. Then what? The banks themselves would be insolvent,
would have to admit publicly their insolvency, and the entire house of
cards would come tumbling down. The result in the 1980s was arrange-
ments among private bankers, indebted nations, and the Fund that linked
extensions of both time to repay old borrowings and new bank loans to
the applicant country's agreement to accept the Fund's prescriptions for
regaining economic health.29
For the Fund, the more new loans it could persuade private banks to
extend, the more those funds could be used to keep interest on external
debt current without using Fund resources for such an unsanctioned pur-
pose. Thus, the Fund, too, was happy to send its technicians into the
27. Numerous works on conditionality exist. For a recent book by a former Fund
official, see Jacques Polak, The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality (OECD 1991).
28. For a examination of the later history of the Fund and the World Bank, see Econ-
omist, A Survey of the IMF and the World Bank: Sisters in the Wood, Oct. 12, 1991, at 7-
48.
29. See id. at 14.
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indebted country to work out the conditions for a standby that would
include a rescheduling of private bank debt.
At the same time, a rethinking of what might aid a "return to eco-
nomic health" also took place.30 Recall again that the original idea of
the Fund was to be a pool of currencies drawings that would permit
countries to withstand a temporary balance of payments crisis. Now the
question/goal at issue was how a country could start earning enough
hard currency to repay the debt it had borrowed from the banks and
official lenders and be able to return to the capital markets for additional
funding. The concept of Fund aid changed from balance of payments
funding to aiding indebted countries to "grow" their way out of their
extreme debt burden.31
The economic prescriptions for returning to balance of payments sta-
bility, however, might be quite different from the economic prescription
for growth.3 2 There is a difference in concept between aid in overcoming
a temporary liquidity crisis and aid to produce a transformation in the
macroeconomic structure of a country so as to further, in theory, growth.
Indeed, so it proved. By the early 1980s, both the Fund and the World
Bank were putting their heads together to design country programs that
were labeled "structural adjustment."33 As articulated by the Fund and
the Bank, structural adjustment involves liberalization of prices, trade,
and exchange followed by "public enterprise reform" (read privatization)
and "financial and banking sector reform."'3 4 Underlying the formal de-
scription seems to be the conviction that only market economies can
grow and that financial assistance, at least in the case of the Fund's spe-
cial facilities, is to help the countries receiving the facilities deal with the
disruptions caused by the move from state ownership to private owner-
ship of means of production, the removal of tariffs, and the freeing of
prices. Thus, the Fund's description of its special facilities in its October
1993 Supplement is headlined-"Financing Helps Members Adjust to
Special Balance of Payments Problems."3 " Of course, it will be recalled
that, under the Fund's charter, what the Fund is supposed to be doing is
aiding members with balance of payments problems. But what if those
30. See id. at 23.
31. See id. at 23-33.
32. See id at 37.
33. For a description of the World Bank's shift from project lender to a setter of
macroeconomic policy conditions on project loans to the making of structural adjustment
loans, see id at 9 & 41.
34. See,eg., Kyrgyz Republic: Further Structural Reforms are Vital to Macroeconomic
Stability, IMF Survey, Oct. 25, 1993, at 322 (describing structural adjustment policies
followed-successfully according to Fund-by Kyrgyz Republic).
35. IMF Survey Supplement, supra note 7, at 18; see also id. (providing picture of
Kyrgyz market and stating that "[t]he country's continued policies of price liberalization
and privatization, especially in agriculture, have lead to increased supplies of goods in its
markets. IMF financial assistance provided under the STF is intended to held cushion
the impact of Kyrgyz Republic economic transition.").
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problems are caused by the Fund's own medicine prescribed to create
growth?
In 1986, continuing its involvement with low-income developing coun-
tries that had come with participation in the multilateral solutions to the
debt crisis, the IMF established a new structural adjustment facility (the
"SAF") to make concessional loans at 0.5 percent interest with repay-
ments beginning 5 years and ending 10 years after each disbursement-
using repayments to a fund that originally had been established at the
time of the Second Amendment to the Fund Agreement to help develop-
ing countries with concessional loans. In December 1987, the IMF es-
tablished an additional fund, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (the "ESAF").3 6 Just this March, an enlarged ESAF has been
put into place and this facility includes contributions from several coun-
tries that had benefitted in the past from the facility, such as
Bangladesh.37
With the SAF, the ESAF, and the enlarged ESAF, it is hard to tell
whether the Fund is making concessional loans to help countries deal
with the balance of payments problems that come with liberalization of
trade, prices, and exchange and privatization or whether the IMF is
making the concessional loans to encourage, nay, insist upon such poli-
cies as a condition of the loans. The IMF Survey October 1993 Supple-
ment describes one of the "objectives" of these facilities as "to help these
countries establish the conditions for sustainable growth .... ,,38 Most
interesting of all, the SAF and the ESAF clearly served as the model for
the Fund's Systemic Transformation Facility (the "STF"). 39 The Fund
created this facility last April for Russia and the other states of the for-
mer Soviet Union. The Fund described the STF as being intended specif-
ically to aid Russia in dealing with balance of payments difficulties
caused by its shift from "trading at non-market prices to multilateral,
market-based trade" and its shift to "world market pricing, particularly
for energy products."'' 4 Very well-certainly the former states of the So-
viet Union have these problems, if for no other reason than the break up
of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, the trading organization
of the former Soviet-bloc countries. But what entitles these countries to
use of the facility, which is not concessional, but on the terms charged by
the Fund for use of its general resources? Use of the facility by a country
is conditioned on compliance with the IMF's usual panoply of condi-
tions, including "a written policy statement describing the objectives of
its economic policy; macroeconomic projects; the structural, fiscal, mone-
36. See Concessional Facilities Assist Low Income Countries, IMF Survey Supplement,
supra note 7, at 21.
37. Camdessus Welcomes Activation of Enlarged ESAF & Broad Based Support, IMF
Survey, Mar. 21, 1994, at 81.
38. IMF Survey Supplement, supra note 7, at 21.
39. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40. See IMF Survey Supplement, supra note 7, at 20.
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tary, and exchange measures to be implemented over the next 12 months;
and if applicable, a technical assistance program."4 Moreover, if the
country is requesting the STF financing outside of borrowing from the
Fund under its usual arrangements or an ESAF arrangement, the coun-
try must convince the Fund that "it will move as soon as possible to-
wards policies that the IMF could support under one of these kinds of
arrangements."42 There, the cat is out of the bag. The goal of the financ-
ing is the conditions themselves, macroeconomic policies in which the
Fund believes.
It is, of course, possible that the G-7 deliberately chose to funnel the
promised $28.4 billion to Russia through the Fund because the G-7
themselves wanted to hold back funding until Russia promised reforms
satisfactory to the Fund. In other words, the G-7 wants to use the Fund
as its "tough love" mother. That is as it may be. But, if the G-7 did
want to aid Russia quickly, without palaver, along the lines Professor
Sachs recommended, they chose an inappropriate institutional method
for doing so.
41. Ia (emphasis added).
42. Id
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